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I. INTRODUCTION
In July 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration handed
down an award, in favor of the Philippines, in the matter of the
South China Sea dispute, between the People’s Republic of China
(China) and the Philippines.1 The Tribunal’s near 500-page award
addressed many disputes involving maritime entitlements around
afforded certain features in the South China Sea. The Tribunal’s legal
reasoning, and China’s reaction to the award, could have an impact
around the world in other disputes involving the law of the sea.
One region that could be impacted by the award is the Arctic.
Disputes in the Arctic are not of the same strategic importance as
those concerning the South China Sea right now.2 Nevertheless,
climate change is leading to reduced ice in the Arctic, and the
increasingly longer periods of open water are leading to an increased
interest in both shipping and exploration for oil and gas.3 This, in
turn, is leading to increased interest in environmental protection in
the region.4With that increased interest, the applicability of some of
the issues decided in the South China Sea Award to disputes in the
Arctic will be of importance.
The disputes in the South China Sea were brought before the
Tribunal under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
1
Thomas Schoenbaum, The South China Sea Arbitration Decision and a Plan
for Peaceful Resolution of the Disputes, 47 J. Mar. L. & Com. 451, 451 ( 2016).
2
See Yann-huei Song, Conflicting Outer Continental Shelf claims in the East and
South China Seas: Proposals for Cooperation and Peaceful Resolution, 35 HAW. L. REV. 485,
490-96 (2013) (explaining ecological importance and explaining U.S. interest); see
also Commander Dustin E. Wallace, An analysis of Chinese Maritime Claims in the South
China Sea, 63 NAVAL L. REV. 128, 130-33 (2014) (explaining shipping importance
and China’s assertion that the South China Sea is a core interest).
3
Andrew Haptsig, Ivy Frederisckson, et. al., Arctic Bottleneck: Protecting the
Bering Strait Region from Increased Vessel Traffic, 18 OCEAN & COASTAL L. J. 35, 35
(2012) (arguing for increased presence for environmental protection to offset
increased risk from increased shipping traffic).
4
Taylor Simpson-Ward, Changes in Latitudes Call for Changes in Attitudes:
Towards Recognition of a Global Imperative for Stewardship, Not Exploitation, in the Arctic,
37 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1239, 1240-1241 (2014) (calling for stewardship over
exploitation).

291

2018

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

6:1

Sea (UNCLOS or the Convention). UNCLOS was signed in 1982
and came into force in 1994 when Guyana ratified.5
UNCLOS is a wide reaching, multi-lateral treaty that defines
the legal rights and responsibilities of states with regards to the
oceans.6 The Convention includes rules with regard to the status and
rights attached to features (e.g. islands, rocks, reefs, etc.), limits of
coastal states’ rights regarding contiguous waters, maritime
conservation, deep-sea mining, and dispute resolution.7
The South China Sea is shared by many states. Within the Sea
are a group of islands known as the Spratly Islands (Spratlys)(see
Figure 1). China, the Philippines, Malaysia, Taiwan, Brunei, and
Vietnam claim sovereignty over all or some of the islands.8 In the
group, there are islands with habitation, along with small, uninhabited
islands and several reefs. China has used these islands and features to
define its territorial seas.9 Along with the dispute over the islands, this
also created an overlap in territorial seas between China and the
Philippines.10
The Philippines sought review under UNCLOS from the
Permanent Court of Arbitration. China objected to the jurisdiction of
the Tribunal, claiming the dispute was about sovereignty of the
Spratlys, which is beyond the reach of UNCLOS.11 The Tribunal
found that while a dispute over sovereignty did exist, it could rule on
Wallace, supra note 2, at 136.
Id. at 137-143 (reviewing the legal arguments put forward by China
defending their actions in the South China Sea).
7
See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 298, Dec. 10,
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
8
Song, supra note 2, 493-494.
9
Zhiguo Gao, Bing Bing Jia, Agora: The Nine-Dash Line in the South China
Sea: History, Status, and Implications, 107 AM. J. INT’L. L. 98, 104, (2013) (explaining
the historical developments of the Nine-Dash line in Chinese law).
10
Id. at 104.
11
In re Arbitration Between the Republic of the Philippines and the
People’s Republic of China, PCA Case No. 2013-19, Jurisdiction and Admissibility,
¶ 1 (Oct. 29, 2015), http://www.pca-cpa.org [hereinafter Award on Jurisdiction]; In
re Arbitration Between the Republic of the Philippines and the People’s Republic
of China, PCA Case No. 2013-19, Award, ¶ 1(July 12, 2016), http://www.pcacpa.org [hereinafter Award].
5
6

292

2018

U.S. Policy in the Arctic

6:1

the issues raised by the Philippines without ruling on the specific
issue of sovereignty.12 UNCLOS has an option to declare issues of
maritime delimitation beyond the reach of mandatory arbitration.13
China exercised that option in 2006.14 The Tribunal found the issue
of maritime zone entitlement to be distinct from maritime
delimitation.15 Because of its objections, China did not participate in
the arbitration and does not accept its rulings.
Despite China’s objections, the Tribunal felt it could move
forward and use Chinese position papers, a collection of documents
from members of the Chinese government outlining their policy, to
represent their positions.16 The Tribunal made important rulings,
both on jurisdiction and on issues relating to entitlements of rights to
maritime zones. On jurisdiction, the Tribunal found that since both
states were parties to UNCLOS, the Tribunal had jurisdiction, even
though one state refused to participate beyond objecting to
jurisdiction.17 The Tribunal also defined “rocks” as features above
water at high tide, but which could not sustain human habitation or
economic life of their own.18 This definition was applied to features
that had people, but used the fact that the inhabitants required
supplies from elsewhere to survive as a basis for their ruling.19 This
definition means that those features could not generate their own
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) or continental shelf.20 Further, the
Tribunal ruled that building on a feature, like a reef, to make it
resemble an island or a “rock” would not change its status or the
See Award ¶1.
See UNCLOS (setting out the circumstances and procedures for opting
out of mandatory dispute resolution proceedings).
14
Id. at art. 298, ¶2.
15
Id.
16
See Award at ¶144 (explaining how the Tribunal used statements made
by the Chinese government both publicly and privately to ensure fairness despite
China’s non-participation).
17
Id. at ¶154 (explaining how the submissions by the Philippines do not
implicate sovereignty, which is beyond the jurisdiction of UNCLOS); see also Id.
¶155 (distinguishing maritime entitlements from maritime delimitation, which
China has opted to negotiate outside of UNCLOS).
18
Id. at ¶280.
19
Id.
20
Id.
12
13
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legal entitlements associated with it, as artificial islands are afforded
no rights.21
Similar issues could present themselves in the Arctic. The ice
in the Arctic has shrunk by thirty-two percent since the 1960’s, and
there is an average loss of 70,000 square kilometers of ice per year.22
Therefore, economic development and commercial activity in the
Arctic is increasing.23 This will lead to opportunities to ship through
northern routes and exploit potential oil and gas reserves, along with
the challenges of environmental protection.24 These developments
have led to an increased need to establish maritime delimitation and
the extent of the continental shelf in the region by Arctic countries.
This comment seeks to take a new look at United States
(U.S.) policy with respect to the Arctic and UNCLOS, through the
lens of the arbitration award in the South China Sea. The first section
of this comment will discuss the background of UNCLOS. Section
two will discuss the arbitration award, from the South China Sea
Arbitration Decision. Section three will examine the issues facing the
Arctic region. Finally, this comment will conclude with an analysis of
whether the ruling in the arbitration award should change U.S. policy
with respect to UNCLOS, particularly in regards to Arctic interests.
II. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
A. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas
As mentioned above, UNCLOS is an international agreement
that defines the rights and responsibilities states have with regard to
21
Ryan Mitchell, Article, An International Commission of Inquiry for the South
China Sea?: Defining the Law of Sovereignty to Determine the Chance for Peace, 49 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 749, 762 (2016).
22
Peter G. Pamel, Robert C. Wilkins, Challenges of Northern Resource
Development and Arctic Shipping, 29 JERL 333 (2011).
23
Jeanne L. Amy, Comment, Historically Iced Out: Calling on the United States
To Resolve Its International Law Disputes in the Arctic Ocean, 40 TUL. MAR. L. J. 137, 137
(2015) (quoting Koji Sekimizu, Secretary General, International Maritime
Organization).
24
Id. at 138-39.
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the oceans.25 Both the Philippines and China are parties to the
Convention. Furthermore, all the Arctic states, except for the U.S.,
are parties to UNCLOS. The Convention can provide a framework
for the Arctic states to set boundaries and regulations in the Arctic.26
Additionally, the Convention also provides an avenue for dispute
resolution, as displayed in the arbitration between the Philippines and
China.
UNCLOS is the culmination of many years of negotiating a
uniform law of the seas. The law of the seas is traced to the ancient
civilizations of Phoenicia, Carthage, India, and China.27 The custom
of freedom of the seas was influenced by major maritime powers
following several disputes in the 16th and 17th centuries, and solidified
in the 19th century by British naval supremacy.28 Along with freedom
of the seas, it was also traditionally recognized that a coastal state
could claim sovereignty over some coastal waters as territorial seas.29
Concerns over access to offshore resources and improved technology
in the mid-20th century led to states extending territorial jurisdiction
further from their coasts, eventually leading to efforts for a codified
law of the seas.30
The first conference on the law of the seas was held in 1958
in Geneva.31 This dealt with the territorial seas and contiguous zone,
the high seas, fishing and conservation on the high seas, and the
continental shelf, though they failed to define the continental shelf.32
Two years later, the second conference was held to decide the
breadth of the territorial sea.33 The U.S. and Canada proposed a
Wallace, supra note 2, at 135.
Lieutenant Commander Joan L. Malik, Article, Essay & Note, United
States Environmental Law Applied in The Arctic Ocean: Frustrating The Balance of the Law
of the Sea, National Sovereignty, and International Collaboration Efforts, 60 NAVAL L. REV.
41, 43 (2010).
27
Louis B. Sohn, John E. Noyes, Erik Franckx, Kristen G. Juras, CASE
MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1 (2d ed. 2014).
28
Id. at 1-2.
29
Id. at 2.
30
Id. at 2-3.
31
Id. at 3.
32
Id.
33
Id.
25
26
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compromise of a six nautical mile territorial sea, but failed; leading
many states to declare a twelve nautical mile breadth.34 This led to the
final conference on the law of the seas, which is UNCLOS.35
UNCLOS provides for sets of rights that belong to a coastal
state. To understand these rights, it is necessary to determine how
UNCLOS defines territorial seas, the exclusive economic zone
(EEZ), and the continental shelf. First, the baseline is the normal low
water mark as it is marked on an officially recognized chart.36 As
such, it is the coastal state that determines the baseline.37 The coastal
state can designate their territorial seas extending outward from the
baseline up to twelve nautical miles.38 The coastal state has
sovereignty over their territorial seas and the airspace above it.39 The
EEZ can extend up to two hundred nautical miles from the
baseline.40 Within the EEZ, the coastal state has exclusive rights for
exploring, exploiting, conserving, and managing resources.41 The
continental shelf comprises the seabed and subsoil of the area
beyond the territorial sea, through the “natural prolongation of its
land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin.”42 If this
prolongation extends less than two hundred nautical miles from the
baseline, the continental shelf will extend out to two hundred miles.43
For cases where the continental shelf extends beyond two hundred
miles from the baselines, the United Nations (UN) set up the
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), which
will decide whether to extend continental shelf jurisdiction to the
coastal state based on evidence from the coastal state.44 The coastal

34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44

Id.
Id. at 3-5.
UNCLOS, supra note 7, art. 5.
Id.
Id. at art. 3.
Id. at art. 2.
Id. at art. 57.
Id. art. 56(1)(a).
Id. at art. 76.
Id.
Id. at art. 76(8).
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state has exclusive rights to the seabed and subsoil rights, but these
rights have no effect on the rights to the water and air above.45
Going hand in hand with the above distinctions are the
definitions and rights attached to features such as islands and reefs.
UNCLOS defines an island as “a naturally formed area of land,
surrounded by water, and above water at high tide.”46 Islands can
entitle the state having sovereignty over it to the full maritime rights
described above.47 However, the Convention distinguishes rocks
from islands. UNCLOS defines rocks as high-tide features that
cannot sustain human habitation or an economic life of their own.48
Rocks get no EEZ or continental shelf, though they do retain a
territorial sea.49 Lastly are low-tide elevations, those above water at
low tide, but submerged at high tide. UNCLOS provides these
features may be used in forming the baseline when in the territorial
sea of the coastal state, but otherwise get no territorial sea of their
own.50
Archipelagic states (states who are entirely made up of a
series of islands) get some different guidelines for establishing
baselines, allowing the state to draw the baseline around the whole of
the islands comprising the state, instead of each island separately,
while include limitations on how much ocean territory can be
claimed. UNCLOS defines archipelagic states as comprised wholly of
one or more archipelagos.51
Along with the rights given to coastal states, all states possess
the right of innocent passage through other states’ territorial seas.52
The purpose of innocent passage is to traverse territorial seas without
entering internal waters or proceeding to or from internal waters.53
Passage must be “innocent,” meaning a ship cannot fish, do research,
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53

Id. at art. 76, 77.
UNCLOS, supra note 7, art. 121(1).
Id. at art. 121(2).
Id. at art. 121(3).
Id.
Id. at art. 13.
Id. art. 46.
Id. at art. 17.
Id. at art. 18(1).
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or show threat of force upon the coastal state.54 While the coastal
state can regulate innocent passage with regards to environmental
protection and maritime safety, the state cannot hamper passage.55 A
corollary to innocent passage is transit passage. All ships have the
right of passage through international straits (passages of water
between two areas of high seas).56 A state can only restrict passage
between an island and the mainland where there is another available
route around island.57 Ships also have the right of passage through
sea-lanes traversing archipelagic waters.58
UNCLOS also provides for responsibilities of states. The
Convention provides that all states have an obligation to protect and
preserve the marine environment.59 Coastal states must use all
practicable means to prevent pollution when exploiting resources
within their jurisdiction and take all measures necessary to prevent
pollution from activities within their jurisdiction from affecting the
marine environment of another state.60 Coastal states have the right
to impose regulations for environmental protection within their
EEZ.61
B. The Arbitration Award
In 2013, the Philippines brought several issues to the
Permanent Court of Arbitration under UNCLOS. Among the issues
brought to the Tribunal, the Philippines sought rulings on the legality
of China’s claims of historic right, the status of certain features of the
Spratlys, and the legality China’s actions surrounding those features,
including: island building, over-fishing, prevention of Filipino
fisherman from fishing, and prevention of oil exploration.62

54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62

Id. at art. 19.
Id. at art. 21, 24.
UNCLOS, supra note 7, art. 38.
Id.
Id. at art. 52.
Id. at art. 192.
Id. at art. 194.
UNCLOS, supra note 7, art. 61.
See Award, generally.
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China objected to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, claiming
the dispute was really about sovereignty over the Spratlys (which is
outside of UNCLOS) and maritime delimitation. China argued they
that maritime delimitation was also outside UNCLOS jurisdiction,
because they had reserved from UNCLOS’s ability to subject
delimitation to mandatory arbitration in 2006. 63 (This was a
reservation provided by UNCLOS, and exercised by China).64 While
the Tribunal recognized those disputes exist between the two states,
the Tribunal decided it could address the Philippines submissions
without ruling on sovereignty or maritime delimitation.65 China and
the Philippines were a part of the 2002 China-ASEAN Declaration
on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. While China
argued against arbitration, the Tribunal reasoned that the ChinaASEAN Declaration was a political agreement with no mechanism
for binding resolution; therefore, it would not preempt arbitration.66
The Philippines challenged the Chinese assertions to
historical rights for most of the area of the South China Sea.67 To the
argument that this was about maritime delimitation, the Tribunal
countered that it was about entitlements, and “[w]hile all sea
boundary delimitations will concern entitlements, the converse is not
the case.”68 The Tribunal reasoned that since UNCLOS does not
provide for freedom of navigation in territorial seas, and China has
recognized that right within the South China Sea, along with other
actions, that China’s claims were not that the South China Sea was a
territorial sea or its internal waters.69 Therefore, China’s claims are
not of historic title, but historic rights that fall short of title.70 In this,
the Tribunal ruled that UNCLOS prevailed over historic rights that
were incompatible with provisions of the Convention, specifically the

Id.
Id at ¶153.
65
Id. at ¶154, 155.
66
Id. at ¶159.
67
Id. at ¶169.
68
Id. at ¶204.
69
Id. at ¶213, 228.
70
Id. at ¶229 (explaining how China’s recognition of freedom of navigation
and over-flight mean the China’s claims are not of title, but some lesser right).
63
64
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Philippines rights within their EEZ.71 The Tribunal further added
that historical navigation and fishing could not form the existence of
a historical right. China would have to engage in behavior beyond
what was allowed under the freedom of the high seas and had the
other states acquiescence.72
Next, the tribunal addressed the status of certain features of
the Spratlys. The Tribunal stated that by the phrase “naturally
formed” in the definition of low tide elevation, UNCLOS meant that
such a feature could not have its legal status changed through human
modification.73 The tribunal continued that low tide elevations are
not land territory and “low tide elevations cannot be appropriated,
although ‘a coastal state has sovereignty over low tide elevations
which are situated within its territorial sea, since it has sovereignty
over the territorial sea itself.’”74
In the Tribunal’s discussion of islands and rocks, it focused
on two main differentiating criteria: (1) the capability for “human
habitation”; and (2) “economic life.” The Tribunal ruled that “human
habitation” is more than human survival.75 That it requires all the
elements necessary to keep people alive, and the conditions that are
conducive to human life and livelihood. 76 This would include food,
water, and shelter. But, importantly, the tribunal noted that the
Convention should not assume mode or culture, as forms of
habitation vary.77 Regarding “economic life,” any economic activity
71
Id. at ¶238 (cites four propositions for handling UNCLOS and other
international agreements: (a) if the convention expressly permits or preserves other
agreements they are unaffected; (b) if UNCLOS does not expressly permit an
agreement, but the terms are not incompatible, the agreement is preserved; (c)
when rights arise independently of the convention and are not incompatible, they
are unaltered; and (d) all agreements incompatible with the convention are
quashed); Id. at ¶247 (explaining that the convention supersedes historical rights to
maritime areas that are in another state’s EEZ).
72
Id. at ¶270.
73
See Award. at ¶305.
74
Id. at ¶309 (quoting Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia),
Judgment, ICJ Reports 2012, p. 624 at p. 641 para. 26).
75
Id. at ¶489 (defining human habitation as used in UNCLOS art. 121(3)).
76
Id.
77
Id. at ¶490.
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relating to the EEZ or continental shelf must be excluded, since
rocks are not entitled to either. However, economic activity in the
territorial sea is considered.78
The tribunal ruled that none of the disputed features in the
Spratlys were fully entitled islands, as some were rocks and others
low-tide elevations.79 Since there was no legal basis for historic rights
beyond those provided in UNCLOS, and none of the features in the
Spratlys are fully entitled islands, no feature was capable of generating
an EEZ or continental shelf.80
Following the ruling on the legal status of the various features
of the Spratlys, the Tribunal turned to Chinese efforts to prevent
Filipino fisherman from fishing near some of the features and efforts
to prevent companies, with contracts with the Philippines, from
exploring for oil in those areas. The disputed features in these
submissions are all within the EEZ or continental shelf of the
Philippines. The coastal state has sovereign rights to explore, exploit,
and manage resources in the EEZ.81 In regards to the prevention of
oil exploration, the Tribunal found that China was aware of the
differing views on the parties’ rights, but sought to enforce the view
instead of seeking resolution, and thereby breeched UNCLOS Article
77.82 While the Tribunal decided there was not enough evidence that
China actively interfered with Filipino fishermen, the adoption of
legislation or the promulgation of a fishing moratorium that would
apply within the Filipino EEZ, would create the realistic prospect
that Filipinos could face punitive measures, and that constituted a
breach of UNCLOS Article 56.83 The Tribunal also ruled on the
activities of Chinese fisherman in the EEZ of the Philippines. The
Tribunal decided that while China is not responsible for the actions
of its fishermen, it can be responsible for a failure to control them if

78
79
80
81
82
83

Id. at ¶502, 513.
Id.
Id. at ¶692.
Id. at ¶700 (citing UNCLOS art. 56).
Id. at ¶708.
Id. at ¶712.
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the state did not conduct due diligence to prevent them from fishing
inside another state’s EEZ.84
Finally, the Tribunal turned to allegations of environmental
degradation by China inside the Philippine’s EEZ. First, the
obligations in Part XII of the Convention apply irrespective of
sovereignty over any feature.85 In regards to the assertion that island
building activities damage the environment, the Tribunal said,
“[s]tates have a positive ‘duty to prevent, or at least mitigate,
significant harms to the environment when pursuing large-scale
construction projects.’”86 Further, UNCLOS Article 92 requires states
“ensure their activities within their jurisdiction and control respect
the environment of other states . . . “87
C. The Arctic
A major issue facing the Arctic is the freedom of the seas for
shipping. Some have predicted that between 2040 and 2059, shipping
lanes through the Northwest Passage, connecting the U.S. east coast
and the Pacific, by route north of Canada, could have open shipping
lanes without an icebreaker ship escort for part of the year.88 The
Nordic Orion, a Danish vessel completed the passage already, and
saved 1,000 miles of transit by avoiding the Panama Canal.
Additionally, the Orion was able to carry twenty five percent more
coal, since they did not have to be concerned with the canal’s
limitations.89 The issue is that Canada has long thought of the
Northwest Passage as the internal waters of Canada, granting them
complete sovereignty. This sentiment was clearly expressed to the

See Award at ¶728-744.
Id. at ¶927 (referencing UNCLOS art. 192).
86
Id. at ¶941 (quoting Indus Waters Kishenganga Arbitration (Pakistan v. India),
Partial Award, 18 February 2013, PCA Award Series (2014), para. 451; quoting
Arbitration Regarding the Iron Rhine (“IJzeren Rijn”) Railway between the Kingdom of Belgium
and the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Award of 24 May 2005, PCA Award Series (2007),
RIAA Vol. XXVII p. 35 at pp. 66-67, para. 59).
87
Id. (citing Legality and Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ
Reports 1996, p. 226 at pp. 240-242, para. 29).
88
Simpson-Ward, supra note 4, 1240-41.
89
Id.
84
85
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U.S. following a U.S. icebreaker made the crossing in 1985.90 The
U.S., on the other hand, believes that the passage is an international
waterway.91 This view is shared by Japan and the European Union.92
If the Northwest Passage is considered internal waters, Canada has
complete sovereignty over the waters and can allow or prohibit
anybody they wish.93 An analog can be found in the Northern Sea
Route, the equivalent of the Northwest Passage, but north of Russia,
where Russia has designated the route as internal waters and created a
permitting system to allow some shipping through the route to
begin.94 Territorial waters, on the other hand, imbue on shippers the
right of innocent passage, meaning they can pass so long as they do
not fish, pollute, spy, or present themselves as a threat.95 UNCLOS
has a similar provision for archipelagic waters, which may apply to
the route through the islands north of Canada through which the
Northwest Passage flows.96
Another issue that could potentially become a problem is
resource exploration. Historically, ocean resources beyond territory
have been free for whoever can exploit them.97 However, UNCLOS
has sought to regulate mining in the seabed, through the
International Seabed Authority (ISA).98 While this was originally
designed to regulate the mining of manganese nodules, the
framework in the convention could be applied to any seabed
mining.99 This provision is largely why the U.S. has failed to ratify the

90
Caitlin O’Leary, The New Ice Age: The Dawn of Arctic Shipping and Canada’s
Fight for Sovereignty Over the Northwest Passage, 46 U. MIAMI INTER. AM. L. REV. 117,
119-124 (2014); See also Melissa Renee Pegna, U.S. Arctic Policy: The Need to Ratify a
Modified UNCLOS and Secure a Military Presence in the Arctic, 44 J. MAR. L. & COM.
169, 177 (2013).
91
O’Leary, supra note 91, at 119.
92
Id.
93
Id. at 122.
94
Id. at 126.
95
Id. at 122.
96
O’Leary, supra note 91, at 122.
97
Kevin V. Cook, The Discovery of Lunar Water: An Opportunity to Develop a
Workable Moon Treaty, 11 GEO. INT’L. ENVTL. L. REV. 647, 679 (1999).
98
Id. at 680.
99
Id.
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convention.100 The U.S. is already in dispute with Canada over
maritime delimitation in the Beaufort Sea, which may hold large
deposits of oil and natural gas.101
Also, while the territorial sea and contiguous zone
designations confer rights upon the coastal state both to the sea and
the sea bed, the EEZ offers only limited rights to the sea itself, but
offers more rights to the seabed and resources within.102 Beyond that,
UNCLOS has created rights attached to the continental shelf. This
would increase seabed mining rights up to 350 nautical miles.103
However, this is not just a given right. The UN established the
UNCLOS.104 Once a coastal state has ratified UNCLOS, they have
ten years to submit to the commission their territorial claim to the
seabed, which must scientifically show that their claim is part of their
continental shelf.105 In the arctic, ice coverage has limited the ability
to complete the necessary studies. Russia submitted their claim,
which purported that their continental shelf reached the North Pole,
but it was denied by the commission, and they are in the process of
preparing another. Canada has not submitted, but it is expected to be
as expansive as Russia’s first claim. These overlapping claims could
create contention in the search for oil. Both Canada and the U.S. are
oil-importing countries with limited ability to drill for oil terrestrially.
Russia has large quantities of known oil and natural gas, but most of
their deposits are in territory with significant Muslim populations,
leaving them with terrorism related challenges.106 The fact that
Russia’s primary exports are resources, including large amounts of
natural gas and petroleum, makes Arctic potential important.107
Environmental protection is also an important issue.
Increased vessel traffic and oil exploration pose threats to a delicate
Id.
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ecosystem. However, the Arctic nations have created the Arctic
Council, which includes the Arctic nations and indigenous
populations.108 While national security topics are off limits for the
council and it has had limited success with other major
disagreements, the council has worked with the International
Maritime Organization towards sustainable development.109
Following the award in the matter of the South China Sea, is
the U.S. better ratifying UNCLOS? Yes. While the U.S. has
maintained that most UNCLOS is customary international law and as
such has followed it, the U.S. is failing to take advantage of the
provisions relating to the continental shelf. Also, they are losing out
on an important dispute resolution tool. While the U.S. enjoys strong
relationships with most arctic states, Russia is a notable exception.
Russia has been increasingly aggressive worldwide, but they have no
history of violating the law of the sea. By not acceding to UNCLOS,
the U.S. has removed itself from the body of international law Russia
seems to respect.
Often overlooked, but used by both Russia and Canada to
support their regulations over their respective sea routes, is Article
234 of UNCLOS. This provision allows for unilateral action by the
coastal state to protect the environment of ice-covered areas within
that coastal state’s EEZ.110 For an area to be within the purview of
Article 234, it must be covered in ice for at least six months of the
year, ice must present an exceptional hazard to navigation, the area
must be particularly susceptible to irreversible damage from
pollution, and the laws in place must have due regard for
navigation.111 While both the Northwest Passage and Northern Sea
Route are covered in ice a majority of the year and the frailty of the
Arctic well known, ice is becoming less of a hazard every year, and it
is questionable whether the laws in place show due regard for
navigation. Canada has begun a mandatory ship reporting and vessel
Malik, supra note 26, at 43.
Id. at 44, 45.
110
Stanley P. Fields, Article 234 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of
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111
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traffic service system (NORDREG).112 This has essentially required
Canadian permission to navigate the Northwest Passage.113 While this
action is legal under the Canadian proposition that the waters of the
passage are the internal waters of Canada, it would not cover
UNCLOS Article 234 if the passage were defined as an international
sea route.
III. APPLYING THE LESSONS OF THE ARBITRATION TO THE ARCTIC
The tribunal in the arbitration between the Philippines and
China considered many arguments over the law of the seas. Likewise,
there are many issues coming to the fore with how to handle the
opening of waters in the Arctic. At first blush, these two areas seem
to have very little in common. The South China Sea is an oft-used sea
route, used for more than half of global maritime commerce.114
Further, it has been used since the beginning of human habitation in
the area, and has supported millions of people who have exploited
the natural resources.115 On the other hand, the Arctic has been
frozen and impassible since explorers first thought to transit the
Northwest Passage, and only small groups of people have made
societies existing in that part of the world.
However, there is much in common as well. Both bodies of
water are bordered by several states with competing interests; they
are both rich in resources; and they both are coveted as shipping
routes. As such, the arbitration award can give insight into how to
handle potential issues that may arise in the Arctic, particularly with
respect to historic rights or title and maritime entitlements, the status
of features, and dispute resolution.
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A. Historic Rights and Title
As stated, Canada views the Northwest Passage as internal
waters. Their view as such was stated as early as 1957.117 In 1985,
Canada announced it would use provisions of UNCLOS to draw
straight baselines around the outside of the Canadian archipelago in
the Arctic, stating, “Baselines would merely trace the ‘outer limit of
Canada’s historic internal waters.’”118 This statement by Secretary
Clark, Canada’s Secretary of State for External Affairs, both
continued the argument that the waters were internal waters and also
used a historic argument as justification. This statement was objected
to by the U.S., stating that “there is no basis in international law to
support the Canadian Claim.”119
116

The leading case in international law for historic rights is the
Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case heard by the International Court of
Justice (ICJ). The case laid out a five-part test for claiming historic
title: (1) jurisdiction as internal waters over claimed area; (2) a long
period of time has passed; (3) there has been no opposition to
claimed jurisdiction; (4) the claim has been continuously pursued; and
(5) has been notoriously asserted.120
Likewise, China has long made claims to historic rights in the
South China Sea. In 2001, China submitted two notes verbales declaring
sovereignty over all the islands in the South China Sea and adjacent
waters and submitted a map with the nine-dash line.121
This was the same claim China has made since the 1950’s,
and it appears that China supports their claim of sovereignty through
historical presence and displays of authority.122 Unlike the Canadian
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claim, however, there is some ambiguity in what China has actually
claimed.123
It is unclear whether China claims sovereignty over all the
waters inside the nine-dash line or what the exact coordinates of the
outer limits are.124 China’s Law on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone states, “The territorial sea of the People’s Republic
of China is the sea belt adjacent to the land territory and the internal
waters of the People’s Republic of China. The waters on the
landward side of the baselines of the territorial sea of the People’s
Republic of China constitute the internal waters of the People’s
Republic of China.”125 China has followed with the statement:
China has indisputable sovereignty over the South
China Sea Islands and the adjacent waters. China’s
sovereignty and relevant rights in the South China
Sea, formed in the long historical course, are upheld
by successive Chinese governments, reaffirmed by
China’s domestic laws on many occasions, and
protected under international law including the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS). . . .126
China has made laws affecting various maritime zones, all in
line with UNCLOS, but has repeatedly invoked rights formed
through history, which speaks to rights beyond those granted in
UNCLOS.127 The tribunal noted three instances where China seemed
to claim rights beyond UNCLOS.128 However, the tribunal noted that
China also asserted its respect for freedom of navigation and over
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flight in the South China Sea.129 Neither of these features are part of a
territorial sea or internal waters. This led the tribunal to determine
that what China claimed was less than sovereignty over the sea.130
Canadian historical claims are quite different from the
Chinese claims. First, the Canadian claim is spelled out exactly, where
the Chinese have resisted spelling out exactly what rights they claim.
Secondly, the Canadians have denied that there is any freedom of
navigation of the Northwest Passage, where the tribunal looked at
China’s acknowledgement of such a right as dispositive proof that
their claim was that of less than sovereignty. However, Canada’s
claim to historical right falls short of the test from Anglo-Norwegian
Fisheries. There has been opposition, as stated from the U.S., as well
as the United Kingdom and others. Further, the long period of time
requirement is somewhat ambiguous. In Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries the
period of time referred to activities spanning a couple hundred
years.131 Also, due to limitations of ice in the region, it would be
difficult for Canada to show that they have continuously pursued
sovereignty over the waters.
B. Features
Another aspect of the arbitration in regard to the South
China Sea was the issue of features and the maritime entitlements.
The South China Sea contains several groups of features, which
China claims and uses as a baseline for the Nine-dash line.132 While
the tribunal avoided the disagreements over sovereignty of these
features, the tribunal did clarify the law over the maritime
entitlements associated with the different types of features.133
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The geography of the arctic is different from that of the
South China Sea. Where the features in the South China Sea include
reefs and atolls, the Arctic has ice sheets and larger islands,
particularly in the Canadian archipelago (see Figure 2). Particularly
interesting was the Tribunal’s ruling on the difference between a
“rock” and an “island” when deciding what entitlement to attach to a
feature. It ruled that to be an island the feature must be capable of
sustaining human habitation.134 The presence of resources alone is
insufficient to make this determination; the feature must show a
human capacity to use the resources.135
While the tribunal was referring to features that barely were
above water at high tide, a similar ruling has the potential to affect
maritime entitlements to some of Canada’s northern most islands. It
is far-fetched that this issue would be brought to an arbitral tribunal,
but it could be argued that these Arctic islands are incapable of
sustaining human habitation. Despite the size being significantly
greater than that of the largest atolls at the center of the South China
Sea Arbitration, the lack of warmth and vegetation would seem to
make it impossible to live on the northern most islands.
C. Dispute Resolution
In the matter of the South China Sea, both parties were
parties to UNCLOS, which subjected them to compulsory
jurisdiction. As stated, the U.S. is not party to UNCLOS, and
therefore is not subject to jurisdiction for disputes under UNCLOS.
Additionally, neither Canada nor the U.S. subscribes to compulsory
jurisdiction of the ICJ.136 So that leaves questions over how the two
would or could solve disputes. If both consented, the ICJ could
deliver a final judgment, but it would only be binding on the
parties.137 Also, since the U.S. is a member of the Arctic Council, and
the council has subscribed itself to UNCLOS through the Ilulissat
Declaration, the U.S. could seek to be heard in front of the

134
135
136
137

Id. at 467.
Id.
Sternheim, supra note 114, at 198-199.
Id. at 198.

310

2018

U.S. Policy in the Arctic

6:1

International Tribunal for the Law of the Seas.138 However, the U.S.
has no influence on who sits on the tribunal, since only parties to
UNCLOS have that right.139 On the other hand, a negative ruling is
not binding on the U.S. This puts gives the U.S. a choice. They could
assent to jurisdiction and risk a ruling against them or avoid a
potential valuable means of dispute resolution. While there is a risk of
losing in arbitration, having the dispute resolution tool at your
disposal is highly valuable. First, you have a platform to state your
case, and second, potential arbitration is a bargaining tool to use in
political negotiations with the other party, so a positive outcome
could be reached without resorting to arbitration.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the end, ratifying UNCLOS would make sense because the
U.S. follows the convention as a matter of policy and customary law.
By not ratifying UNCLOS, the U.S. has given up access to pursue an
extended continental shelf and access to the convention’s dispute
resolution mechanisms. Nevertheless, the U.S. will still be held to
most of the provisions as a matter of customary international law.
However, when approaching the question from the point of
view of the country’s Arctic interests, it appears inconsequential. As a
member of the Arctic Council, and its declaration to follow
UNCLOS as a group, the U.S. may have found a way into dispute
resolution proceedings.
Applying the lessons from the South China Sea arbitration
award to this question furthers the idea that signing UNCLOS would
not serve to further the U.S. interests in the Arctic. While using the
ruling on features to limit Canada’s maritime entitlements in the
Arctic is interesting, it is highly unlikely to ever come up. The main
corollary between the ruling and real disagreements in the Arctic is
the status of both the Northwest Passage and the Northern Sea
Route. In each case, the ruling would aid the U.S.’s arguments that
the routes are international passages. However, the Arctic Council
138
139
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provides its own mechanism for resolution, and may provide a
window into UNCLOS mandatory proceedings.
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APPENDIX
Figure 1

Source: Map attached to China’s Notes to the UN SecretaryGeneral140
140

Map attached to China’s 7 May 2009 Notes Verbales Attachment to Note
Verbale from the Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the
United Nations to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, No.
CML/17/2009 (7 May 2009) (Annex 191); Note Verbale from the Permanent
Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations to the Secretary General of the United Nations, No. CML/18/2009 (7 May 2009) (Annex 192).
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Figure 2

Source: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration141

International Bathymetric Chart of the Arctic Ocean, National Centers for
Environmental Information, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,
found online at: https://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/mgg/bathymetry/arctic/images/IB
CAO_ver1map_letter_low.jpg
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